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The present study examined a number of relevant 
underlying cognitions of depression, within the context 
of learned helplessness theory, and more specifically, 
reformulated learned helplessness theory. Previous 
research has found mixed support for the possibility 
that locus of control, moderates the effects of life 
stress on depression. Externality is theoretically 
linked to helplessness and in order to elucidate the 
role of controllability in depression, the Levenson IPC 
scales (Levenson, 1974) were employed in the present 
study. The attributional reformulation of learned 
helplessness theory proposes that depressives 
make more attributions to internal, stable, global 
causal factors over negative events than do 
non-depressives. In addition to an assessment of 
maladaptive attributional style, Harvey (1981) included 
a controllable - uncontrollable dimension of causes in 
his questionnaire and found that depressives also made 
attributions to controllable causes. This finding, 
using student subjects, minimized the central 
11 
importance of helplessness as related to depression. 
The present study attempted to test the above 
findings. Subjects included 126 college students and 
26 out-patient counselling subjects. Each was given a 
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967), the Levenson 
IPC scales (Levenson, 1974), a Life Events Inventory 
(Cochrane and Robertson, 1973), and an Attribution 
Style Questionnaire (Hammon & Mayol, 1982). A multiple 
classification of analyses of variance revealed that 
male out-patients make attributions to internal, 
stable, global factors; while female out-patients, the 
highest scoring BDI group, made attributions to 
external, stable, global factors. There was partial 
support for the maladaptive attributional style, but 
several questions and issues were raised. In contrast 
to the findings of Harvey (1981), females whether 
depressed or not, attributed the cause of stressful 
events to external factors. Finally, a series of 
step-wise multiple regression analyses were conducted 
on the data to examine the relative contribution of the 
attributions generated from the Attribution Style 
Questionnaire and the three locus of control scales. 
iii 
Results reveal the Uncertainty, Powerful other and 
Chance scales are the best overall predictors of 
depression. The above findings lend support to the 
learned helplessness model of depression rather than a 
negative self-attitude model (Beck, 1967). 
iv 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Depression and Cognitions of Significant Life Events 
The causes and consequences of depression have long 
occupied the attention of psychologists. Despite its 
importance as a mental health problem, little is 
understood about depression. It is a construct 
encompassing a heterogeneous set of behaviours. 
Briefly, depression is characterized by (1) sad affect, 
(2) biological changes, (3) behavioural retardation 
(slowed activity and speech, inertia, lack of 
initiative), (4) generalized attitudes of pessimism 
(negativity, hopelessness, self-depreciation, guilt), 
and passivity (loss of interest, lack of motivation, 
helplessness). 
Within recent years considerable theory and 
research about the causes of depression has concerned 
the role of cognitive processes (Beck, 1967; Abramson, 
Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Burger, 1984; Nelson & 
Cohen, 1983; Ganellen & Blaney, 1984; Burns, Shaw & 
Croke, 1987). Contemporary theories of depression such 
as those of Beck (1967, 1976), Seligman (1975), and 
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) have emphasized 
depression as a response to interpretations of negative 
events. These researchers and their colleagues share 
the view that it is the appraisals of events rather 
than their mere occurrence which shapes the nature and 
intensity of dysfunctional reactions. 
Within the past ten years many researchers have 
explored the idea that cognitive aspects of depression 
may be amenable to an attributional analysis (Rehm & 
O'Hara, 1979; Abramson fie Sackeim, 1977; Abramson et al. 
1978). The symptomatalogy of depression is intimately 
related to the manner in which depressed individuals 
make inferences about the world and their role in the 
world. Such symptoms as pessimism, low self-esteem, 
and guilt translate easily into the vocabulary of 
attribution theory. Guilt, for instance, may represent 
the attribution of failure to intentional lack of 
effort. The processes that produce and maintain 
depression, then, may parallel processes that produce 
and maintain specific modes of making attributions. 
Similarly, therapy procedures for depression may be 
clarified or improved, if they are viewed as procedures 
for modifying attributions (Rehm & O'Hara, 1979). 
Learned helplessness and locus of control are 
constructs closely related to attribution theory and 
each have been applied to analyses of depression. 
These constructs along with other dimensions of 
attribution and the reconceptualization of learned 
helplessness shall be discussed. 
Perceptions of Personal Control and Depression 
In social learning terms (Rotter, 1966) perceived 
control is defined as a generalized expectancy for 
internal as opposed to external control of 
reinforcements. It is assumed that individuals develop 
a general expectancy operating across a variety of 
situations regarding their ability to control their 
lives. The generalized expectancy of internal versus 
external control of reinforcement involves a causal 
analysis of success and failure, involving the 
interpretation of the cause of those experiences 
(Lefcourt, 1976). Internal control refers to the 
perception of one's life events as being a consequence 
of one's own actions and/or personality characteristics 
and attributes, and thereby under personal control. 
External control refers to the perception of one's life 
events as being a function of luck, chance, fate. 
powerful others, or powers beyond personal control or 
comprehension (Rotter, 1966; Lefcourt, 1966; Joe, 
1^71). 
Accordingly, individuals are said to differ along a 
continuum of the extent to which they believe that 
events in their lives are controlled by themselves 
(internal locus of control) or by external sources, 
such as powerful others and chance (external locus of 
control). Furthermore, it is assumed that these 
beliefs'represent stable individual differences. 
Several investigators have examined the correlation 
between measures of locus of control and measures of 
depression. The majority of findings indicates that 
external locus of control tends to correlate positively 
with self-reports of depression (Abramowitz, 1969; Goss 
& Morosko, 1970; Warehime & Woodson, 1971; Calhoun, 
Cheeney, & Dawes, 1974; O'Leary, Donovan, & Hague, 
1974; Emmelkamp, 1975; Procuik, Breen, & Lussier, 1976; 
Leggett & Archer, 1979; Costello, 1982). 
As a result, many researchers have concluded that 
depressed persons tend to be external and consequently, 
passive with regard to important events in their lives. 
Individuals characterized by a belief in external 
control may not be as motivated to engage in the 
instrumental responses necessary to achieve 
gratification which results in a decreased level of 
adtivity (Rehm & O'Hara, 1979). 
Several scales have been developed to measure the 
locus of control construct for specific populations 
(Rotter, 1966; Reid & Ware, 1974; Mischel, Zeiss, & 
Zeiss, 1974; Lefcourt, 1976). The availability of 
Rotter's (1966) Internal-External Locus of Control 
Scale has led to a number of correlational studies with 
depression, which have produced much controversy. 
First, most of the investigators have employed the 
Rotter (1966) scale. Several factor-analytic studies 
have demonstrated that this bipolar locus of control 
scale may be multidimensional (Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & 
Beattie, 1969; Mirels, 1970; Cherlin & Boroque, 1974; 
Viney, 1974). For example, it is unclear whether an 
external locus of control reflects a belief that 
powerful others or chance or a combination of both is 
responsible for what happens to the individual. 
Obscured differences may only be observed through the 
use of a multidimensional scale, such as the Levenson 
IRC Scales (1974). 
Furthermore, Lament (1972) maintained that mood may 
be confounded with item content on the Rotter scale. 
He found that when subjects rated the Rotter scale 
items, the external items were judged to be 
significantly more depressive in tone than internal 
items. When the items were re-written to reflect 
positive, neutral or negative mood so that item mood 
level was partialled out statistically, the 
correlations between depression and the Rotter scale 
were no longer significant. These findings were 
replicated by Aiken and Baucom (1982) as well as Evans 
and Dinning (1978). 
Another issue surrounding the suggested association 
between externality and depression, is a possible 
temporary shift in perception of control. Gilbert 
(1976) suggested that a change from internal to 
external expectancies of control may be an important 
antecedent to depression. He found that individuals 
attending a university counselling centre were able to 
distinguish between characteristic and situational 
perceptions of control and, although, reporting greater 
externality in describing their immediate situation, 
described themselves in many cases as characteristically 
internal. Thus, under distress, the general tendency to 
appraise internal control may yield to an external 
perception giving rise to a sense of loss of control. 
Another group of studies have examined the 
personality dimension of control in the context of 
experimental manipulations of control or learned 
helplessness. These researchers find that under 
certain experimental conditions individuals perceiving 
a lack of personal control over traumatic events will 
exhibit increased signs of depression (Miller & 
Seligman, 1975; Leggett & Archer, 1979; Pittman & 
Pittman, 1979, Hiroto, 1974). One of the key 
experimental manipulations in the creation of 
helplessness is the altering of individuals' 
cognitions from one of assumed control to one of no or 
little control over the experimental task. 
Some investigators examining the influence of locus 
of control beliefs within a learned helplessness 
experimental setting have found that internals and 
externals respond differently to the experience of 
uncontrollability. Hiroto (1974), for example, 
utilizing extreme groups on the internal-external 
dimension, demonstrated that subjects with an external 
locus of control performed more poorly on certain tasks 
after experiences with uncontrollable situations than 
did internals. However, Pittman and Pittman (1979) 
found this to be the case only with relatively mild 
experiences with uncontrollability. Results revealed 
that internals exhibited greater performance decrements 
arid reported greater depression under high helplessness 
conditions than did externals. In low helplessness 
conditions, internals tended to perform better on the 
anagram task than control subjects, while externals 
tended to perform worse than controls and internals, 
and reported greater depression than internals. In 
other words, after only mild experiences with 
uncontrOllability, externals showed helplessness 
effects. It would seem, then, that internals are more 
prone to depression than externals under extensive 
conditions of helplessness. Under less severe 
conditions of helplessness, externals may be more prone 
to depression than internals. Thus, degree of 
experimentally manipulated helplessness may affect the 
locus of control and depression relationship. 
The above studies seem to indicate that the Rotter 
(1966) scale may not accurately predict behaviour 
logically related to locus of control. 
Externality and Coping 
Ganellen and Blaney (1984) suggested that there are 
several unanswered questions concerning the manner in 
which belief in the influence of chance (externality) 
mediates reactions to stressful events. Researchers 
such as Johnson and Sarason (1978) have claimed that 
stress may have its most adverse effects on individuals 
who perceive themselves as having little or no control 
over such stressful events. According to Ganellen and 
Blaney (1984) such a claim is ambiguous. They 
questioned whether the locus of control construct 
measures beliefs about one's responsibility for the 
creation of past stressful events or perceptions of 
control over future events. The former possibility 
which may be related to self-blame for an event's 
occurrence is consistent with an internal, attribution 
perspective (i.e., Abramson, Selignman, Teasdale, 1978) 
and a negative self-attitude model of depression (Beck, 
1967). The latter possibility, in contrast, may be 
related to attempts to cope with stressful events once 
they have occurred. In this case, external 
attributions, such as to chance factors should reduce 
negative affect when stressful events occur. 
Two recent studies argue against the possibility 
that externality explains why past events occurred. 
Hammon and Mayol (1982) examined types of events, their 
relation to depression, and typical cognitive 
appraisals of events. Events were classified as to 
whether subjects were responsible for them and whether 
the events were desirable or undesirable. The events 
most strongly related to depression, those that were 
undesirable-responsible, were seen as being 
controllable, internally caused, intended, expected, 
and likely to recur. Harvey (1981) found that 
depressed subjects described negative events as being 
both internally caused and controllable rather than as 
being caused by chance factors. These studies suggest 
that subjects do not appraise depression-relevant 
events as being caused by chance factors. Externality, 
therefore, seems unlikely to explain why past events 
occurred. 
Learned Helplessness and Depression 
The work of Seligman and Maier (1967) in laboratory 
experiments with animals gave rise to the "learned 
helplessness" model of depression. Dogs, given an 
experience in which they cannot escape or avoid a 
noxious stimulus, behave passively when placed in a new 
aversive context, even though a response is available 
that will permit escape from the painful event. The 
prior experience with uncontrollable, aversive 
stimulation is said to result in learned helplessness, 
manifested in a motivational deficit and in an 
interference with the learning of new response-relief 
contingencies. Seligman (1975) argued that it was not 
the exposure to aversive stimulation per se which 
caused the deficient instrumental learning but the 
uncontrollability of the stress. At the root of the 
learned helplessness model was the apparent need for 
control over the environment. Accordingly this need 
for control is so important that when one comes to 
expect that certain events are uncontrollable, 
hopelessness and depression may result. The experience 
of lack of control over aversive events produces a 
belief that responding is independent of outcome. This 
belief, termed "learned helplessness", parallels 
Rotter's external locus of control construct, and is 
also related to the attributional concept of external 
attribution of causality of the reformulated learned 
helplessness model of depression (Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978). 
Using principles developed in an experimental 
psychology laboratory, Seligman (1975) developed an 
analogue of human depression. Seligman's hypothesis 
was that the primary cognitive symptom of reactive 
depression in humans was essentially a state of learned 
helplessness, characterized most notably by the 
perception of non-control. In several studies, Seligman 
and his colleagues have attempted to demonstrate that 
depressed and helpless subjects were less likely to 
alter beliefs regarding future success, despite 
previous success or failure (Miller & Seligman, 1973, 
1976; Klein & Seligman, 1976). These studies were 
crucial because they attempted to test directly the 
central tenet of the helplessness model—the belief of 
independence of response and important outcomes. 
Although there is some evidence for arguing that 
externality is a symptom of depression, it has not yet 
been powerfully demonstrated that helplessness is the 
appropriate model for externality (Rehm & O'Hara, 
1979). 
As the many human studies of learned helplessness 
appeared, it gradually became apparent that the model 
was not predictive of the behaviour of humans as well 
as of animals. Furthermore, the basic model was 
questioned on a number of empirical and logical grounds 
(Blaney, 1977). Among the problems posed was the 
generalizability of the effect. Why should the effects 
of uncontrollability transfer across mode of task to 
co'ntingencies discriminably different from the 
original? There was also the problem of the 
inconsistency between learned helplessness and the 
symptom of guilt. If depressed persons believe that 
they have no control over the major events in their 
lives, then why should they feel guilty about past 
unhappy events? Guilt implies responsibility and thus 
an internal attribution and an internal locus of 
control. Abramson and Sackeim (1977) discussed this 
paradox and pointed out that it exists in clinical 
descriptions of depressive symptomatology, in 
theoretical accounts, and empirical findings with 
depressed subjects. These problems were of particular 
interest and led to the reformulation of the original 
learned helplessness model of depression. 
Reformulated Learned Helplessness and Depression 
To account for the above findings, the learned 
helplessness model was reformulated in attribution 
theory terms. Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) 
have suggested an attributional model from learned 
helplessness and discuss what they refer to as a 
"reformulated learned helplessness" model of 
depression. The model proposed that the relation 
between expectation of uncontrollability and depressive 
* t. 
symptoms is mediated by an attribution of causality for 
the outcome that is perceived as uncontrollable. The 
researchers argued that attributions of causality can 
be classified along three dimensions. These dimensions 
are internal-external, stable-unstable, and global- 
specifid. 
Basically, the model maintained that the 
attribution of causality one makes for a traumatic 
uncontrollable event will determine the type and extent 
of one's depression. Attributions on the global- 
specific dimension influence the degree of generality of 
the depression. Individuals may thus be depressed with 
regard to one specific area of their life or experience 
a more general debility. Attributions on the stable- 
unstable dimension lead to a transient depression, 
whereas a stable attribution leads to a more chronic 
depression. Attributions to internal versus external 
causes influence self-esteem. According to the model, 
loss of self-esteem occurs only following an internal 
attribution to an aversive event. Seligman, Abramson, 
Semmel, and von Baeyer (1979) found that depressed 
college students, compared to non-depressed college 
students, attributed bad outcomes to internal, stable, 
and global causes, as measured by an attributional style 
scale. These authors concluded that a maladaptive 
attributional style predisposes individuals to react in 
a depressive way to the presence of aversive events or 
the non-occurrence of positive events. Consequently, 
negative events attributed to internal (personal), 
stable (unchanging) and global (wide ranging) 
attributions are considered more devastating 
emotionally. According to this analysis, individuals 
vary in their susceptibility to depression as a function 
of differences in attributional style. In addition, 
people who tend to attribute failure to internal, 
stable, and global factors are more prone to guilt and 
chronic generalized depression. 
In order to account for the weaknesses of the 
original model of learned helplessness, two forms of 
helplessness were postulated. In the first form people 
are helpless because they believe that events are caused 
externally and are independent of their own behaviour. 
These depressed people would logically behave in an 
apathetic passive manner but would not necessarily 
exhibit low self-esteem and self-depreciation. The 
second type of depressed people would believe their 
helplessness to be due to their own lack of ability, 
effort, capacity or skill. This personal helplessness • 
would result in low self-esteem and self-depreciation. 
This analysis would also explain why prior studies found 
inconsistencies in the correlation between depression 
and externality cited previously in the locus of control 
literature. However, the idea of two forms of 
helplessness is not entirely consistent with the 
clinical or research literature which suggests that both 
forms of attributions are often present in the same 
individual (Abramson & Sackeim, 1977). 
In order to account for the clinical phenomenon of 
self-blame/guilt, Harvey (1981) suggested that an 
assessment of the controllability of perceived causes be 
specified and included in the attributional model. Since 
Abramson, Seligman, Teasdale, and von Baeyer (1979) did 
not include the controllable dimension of causes in 
their attributional model of depression, internal 
attributions for aversive outcomes must have accounted 
for feelings of helplessness as well as self-blame. 
However, Harvey (1981) claimed that it was not clear 
that the internal-external dimension alone could 
sufficiently describe the cognitive basis for 
self-blame. If one assumed that people are to blame 
only for what is presumed to be intentional, then blame 
by others and by oneself hinges on whether the cause of 
a negative event is perceived as controllable. Internal 
causes may not always be perceived as controllable, such 
as an individual who attributes the failure of a college 
entrance examination to subaverage native intelligence. 
The internal dimension, therefore, cannot sufficiently 
account for self-blame and hence, the controllable 
dimension of causes needs to be adequately assessed 
among the cognitions underlying depression (Abramson & 
Sackeim, 1977; Harvey, 1981). 
The controllable dimension of causes is also 
important in distinguishing between helplessness and low 
self-esteem models of depression. Given the central 
role of uncontrollability in the original and 
reformulated learned helplessness models of depression 
(Maier & Seligman, 1967; Abramson et al. 1978), these 
models appear to predict that depressives more often 
attribute outcomes to uncontrollable causes. In 
contrast to the learned helplessness models. Beck's 
(1967) negative self model focuses on depressives' 
attitudes toward the self, and would predict that 
depressed individuals would rate themselves as having 
greater responsibility over negative events than 
ndn-depressed persons. It would seem, then, that both 
the perceived locus of causality and perceived control 
dimensions of causes of events need to be addressed 
further in studies of cognitions and depression. 
More recently the theory of causal attributions has 
led to the recent formulations relevant to depression 
and contributed the dimensions of intentionality, 
expectation (anticipation), degree of uncertainty caused 
by the event, and likelihood of its recurrence (c.f. 
Hammon & Mayol, 1982) ; thereby, reducing the possibility 
of a confound of unintended and unwanted events with 
uncontrollable events. 
Purpose of The Present Study 
Most of the studies reported (Abramson et al. 1978; 
Seligman et al. 1979; Harvey, 1981; Hammon and Mayol, 
1982) are based on the perceptions of young adult 
college students most of whom were non-depressed. 
College students may perceive stressful events 
differently than do depressed non-student adult 
populations. The present study, then, compared both 
student and out-patient counselling populations on 
depression relevant cognitions. It was predicted that 
the out-patient groups (male and female) would be 
significantly more depressed than student groups. Given 
the central role of uncontrollability (lack of 
control/helplessness) in the reformulated learned 
helplessness model of depression, it was predicted that 
the more depressed the subjects the more attributions to 
uncontrollable causes. This finding would be consistent 
with the proponents of the original and reformulated 
learned helplessness models but contrary to the findings 
of Harvey, Hammon and Mayol, who all found that 
"helplessness” was not a feature of depression for most 
of their sample. Once again, these researchers used a 
student sample, that was non-depressed. Consistent with 
maladaptive attributional style, out-patients will make 
more internal, stable, global attributions than the 
student groups. 
Furthermore, using the multidimensional locus of 
control scale, results will indicate a belief in 
external factors is associated with greater depression. 
However, the Levenson scales will be able to indicate 
whether perceptions to powerful others or to chance 
factors is specifically related to high depression 
20 
scores. 
The locus of control and learned helplessness 
literature indicate that the domain of depression- 
related cognitions regarding the perception of control 
is more complex and differentiated than is captured by 
most methodologies (Blaney, 1977; Burger, 1983; Brewin, 
1986). Using multiple regression statistical analysis, 
the present study will demonstrate the best overall 
predictors of depression. They are expected to be the 
internal-external dimension, the uncontrollable- 
controllable dimension, and the externality scale of the 
Levenson scales. The importance of each of these 
dimensions has previously been established, and on a 
theoretical note, they capture the central notion of 
"helplessness” which is central to the reformulated 




A total of 126 undergraduate students, 94 females 
and 32 males, ranging in age from 18 to 67 years, 
participated in the study. Classes from the social 
sciences department of the various post-secondary school 
institutions in the Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario region 
(Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Ontario; Lake 
Superior State College, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan; 
li 
Algoma University College, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario) 
were approached and requested for volunteers' 
participation in the study. 
In addition, an out-patient counselling population 
from the Psychology Department, Plummer Memorial Public 
Hospital, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, was recruited. At 
the time of a client's first appointment, the individual 
was asked through written instructions on a "Consent To 
Research Study" form (see Appendix A) whether 
participation in the study was desired. In the event of 
a positive indication, the client was given a packet and 
requested to return it completed to the department of 
psychology on the day of a second appointment. This 
method generated an out-patient counselling population 
of 26, 19 females and 7 males, ranging in age from 18 to 
53 years. 
Apparatus 
All subjects completed a booklet containing the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967), the Levenson IPC 
scales (1974), a Life Events Inventory (Cochrane & 
Robertson, 1973), and an Attribution Style Questionnaire 
as found in Hammon and Mayol (1982). (Refer to Appendix 
B for a sample booklet). 
The BDI is a 21 item self-report measure of the 
affective, behavioural, cognitive, and somatic symptoms 
of depression. The measure has been shown to correlate 
highly (r=.77, p<.05) in college students with 
psychiatrist-rated depression (Bumberry, Oliver, & 
McClure, 1978) and with interview-based Hamilton Rating 
Scale for Depression scores (Hammon, 1980; r=.75 
p<.05). The range of possible scores extends from 0 to 
63, with scores of 0 to 9 being categorized as not 
depressed, 10 to 15 as mildly depressed, 16 to 23 as 
moderately depressed and 24 to 63 as severely depressed. 
The Levenson IPC scales (1974) each consist of 8 
items, a total of 24 items, on a Likert 6-point scale so 
that the 3 scales are statistically independent from one 
another. Levenson constructed and validated the 
multidimensional locus of control scale to measure 
perceptions of influence bn outcomes expected by 
internal mastery, control exerted by powerful others, 
and chance. The three scores provided by the scales 
are; the extent to which one believes that one is 
personally responsible for what happens to one (internal 
score); the extent to which one believes that powerful 
others tend to control what happens to one (powerful 
other score); and the extent to which one believes that 
what happens to one is determined by chance (chance 
score). 
The booklet also contained a Life Events Inventory, 
comprising of 55 items (Cochrane & Robertson, 1973). 
Through the use of inter-rater judges, Hammon and Mayol 
(1982) classified the events of a modified Life Events 
Inventory (1973) by event type (Type A, 
desirable-responsible; Type B, undesirable-responsible; 
Type C, undesirable-not responsible; Type D, ambiguous). 
The Attribution Style Questionnaire (1982) consists 
of 9 items rated on 7-point scales. The dimensions 
measured are: Upset, Control, Locus of Causality 
(internal or external), Stability, Globality. 
Recurrence, Intentionality. Expectation, and 
Uncertainty. (Refer to Appendix C). Hammon and Mayol 
(1982) report information on the reliability of these 
scales and suggest that these single-item cognition 
scales have sufficient reliability to warrant use as 
research tools. 
Procedure 
All participants each received a booklet with the 
questionnaires. All instructions for filling out the 
inventories and questionnaire were contained in the 
packets. For the Life Events Inventory subjects were 
instructed to indicate the significant life events which 
had occurred within the previous 6 months of this 
study. Ganellen and Blaney (1984) suggested that 
retrospective reporting of events that occurred more 
than six months before recall may result in substantial 
under-reporting of event occurrence when compared to 
actual records of event frequency. For this reason the 
events occurring within the last six months of this 
study were requested rather than those occurring within 
the previous year. 
Abramson et al.'s (1978) findings lend partial 
siipport to an attribution model of depression, 
suggesting that depressed individuals attribute causes 
of failure to themselves to a greater degree than 
non-depressed individuals. However, the 
generalizability and validity of their results may be 
limited by the artificial and structured methods used to 
assess attributional style. The most popular assessment 
method has been the use of dimensional attributional 
rating scales of hypothetical events and outcomes 
(Sweeney & Bailey, 1986). In the present study, it was 
reasoned that by using real-life past significant 
stressful events, the causal relation between 
attributions and depression would be expected to be 
stronger than in imagined hypothetical situations, 
therefore, for each of up to 5 of the indicated events 
on the Life Events Inventory, participants were 
requested to complete the Attribution Style 
Questionnaire. 
Booklets completed by the student and out-patient 
samples were each further divided into male and female 
groups. A 2 X 2 factorial design (refer to Table 1) was 
used, with group and sex as fixed factors. 
Table 1 
2x2 Factorial Design 
Group Sex 
Males Females Total 
Students 32 94 126 
Out-Patients 19 26 
Total 39 113 152 
A series of one-way analyses of variance were 
conducted to obtain means and deviation scores on all 
va'riables for each of the 2 factors. A multiple 
classification of analyses of variance was, then, 
employed to generate any significant main effects and 
interactions on all variables. All independent variables 
(criterion predictors) were entered into seven step-wise 
multiple regression analyses to predict depression 
scores generated by the BDI (criterion). Finally, a 
series of Pearson correlation studies were conducted in 
order to compare and determine the strength of the 




Using the Statistical Package for the Social Science 
(SPSS/PC) software (SPSS INC.)/ several statistical 
analyses were conducted on the data. One-way analyses 
of variance were conducted each by sex and group. 
Several significant differences were noted, therefore, 
neither the group or sex groups could be collapsed. 
Multiple classification analyses of variance were 
applied on all variables by group and sex. (Refer to 
Tables 2 to 6 for a summary of means and standard 
deviation scores). (For a summary of significant main 
effects and interactions, refer to Figures 1 to 13) . 
A main effect for group on the Internal locus of 
control was significant, F(l, 148)=7.61, p<.01. Female 
out-patients indicated significantly lower Internal 
scores than all other groups. Out-patient males 
reported significantly greater Internal scores than 
female out-patients. Student females also reported 
significantly greater internality than out-patient 
females. 
A group x sex interaction effect on the Powerful 
Other locus of control scale resulted in a significant 
F(l,148)=6.66, Female out-patients reported a 
significantly greater mean Powerful Other score than all 
other groups, while male out-patients indicated the 
significantly lowest Powerful Other score. 
A group X sex interaction effect on the Chance locus 
of control dimension resulted in a significant F(l, 
148)=11.05, p<.01. Female out-patients reported a 
significantly higher mean Chance score, while male 
out-patients reported the lowest mean Chance score. 
Main' effects for group and sex on Upset were 
significant, F(l, 139)=12.97, p<.01; F(l, 139)=8.93, 
E<.01, respectively. Female students reported a 
significantly higher mean Upset score than did male 
students, while female out-patients reported 
significantly higher Upset scores than student males. 
Main effects for group and sex on the Control 
dimension were obtained, F(l, 139)=4.05, p<.05; F(l, 
148)=4.15 p<.05, respectively. Male students reported 
significantly greater mean Control scores over life 
events than female students. Female out-patients 
reported significantly lower mean Control scores than 
both student groups. 
A sex main effect on Locus of Causality was 
obtained, F(l, 139)=101.06, p<.01. Female students 
reported a significantly greater external locus of 
causality than male students, while female out-patients 
also indicated a significantly greater mean locus of 
Causality, indicating greater externality than male 
out-patients. 
A main effect for group on Stability was obtained, 
F(l, 139)=4.36, p<.05. Out-patient males reported a 
greater mean Stability score than did male students. 
Female out-patients reported a significantly greater 
mean Stability score than female students. 
A main effect for group on Globality was also 
obtained, F(l, 139)=9.84, p<.01. Out-patients reported 
significantly higher Globality scores than did 
students. Specifically, out-patient males and females 
reported higher mean Globality scores than student males 
and females, respectively. 
A significant group main effect and a marginal group 
X sex interaction on Recurrence were obtained, F(l, 
139)=4.86, p<.05 F(l, 139)=3.76, p<.054, respectively. 
Male students reported a significantly greater 
Recurrence mean score, than female students and 
out-patient males. 
No significant main effects or interactions on 
Intentionality were indicated. 
significant main effects for group and sex on 
Uncertainty scores were obtained, F(l, 139)=17.41, 
£<‘.001; F(l, 139)=6.52, £<.05, respectively. 
Out-patients reported significantly higher mean 
Uncertainty scores than the student groups. Both female 
out-patients and students reported significantly greater 
mean Uncertainty scores than males. Male students 
reported the significantly lower mean degree of 
Uncertainty, while female out-patients reported the 
significantly greater mean Uncertainty score. 
A significant group main effect for Expectation was 
obtained F(l, 139)=4.57, £<.05. Students reported 
significantly greater mean Expectation scores than 
out-patients. 
Table 2 
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations and Variances 
for Male Students (N=32). 






















































Definition of Variables 
BD*I - (depression score) 
Internal - (personal mastery over event outcomes) 
Powerful Other - (extent to which one believes control 
exerted by others) 
Chance - (extent of belief that outcomes are determined 
by luck, fate, chance) 
Upset - (degree of upset over event occurrence) 
Control (degree of control) 
Causality - (extent to which cause of event due to 
internal-external factors) 
Stability - (extent to which causes are unchanging/ 
changing) 
Globality - (extent to which causes affect other areas 
of life) 
Recurrence - (likelihood of event occurrence within next 
3 years) 
Intentionality - (extent of intent of event occurrence) 
Expectation - (extent of expectation of event 
occurrence) 
Uncertainty - (degree of uncertainty experienced as a 
result of event occurrence) 
Table 3 
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations and Variances 
for Female Students (N=94). 






















































Summary of Means and Standard Deviations and Variances 
foi: Male Out-patients (N=7). 






















































SuiMTiary of Means and Standard Deviations and Variances 
fo'r Female Out-patients (N=19) . 





















































Figure 1. Mean BOI Scores. 
0  1—^^—I  
STUDENTS OUT-PATIENTS 
GROUP 
  MALES 
__ FEMALES 
Figure 2, Mean Internal Scores. 
STUDENTS OUT-PATIENTS 
GROUP 
  MALES 
__ FEMALES 









Figure 5. Mean Upset Scores. 





Figure 6» Mean Control Scores. 
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Figure 1, Mean Locus of Causality Scores. 
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Figure 9. Mean Globalitv Scores. 
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Figure 10. Mean Recurrence Scores. 
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Ficmre 11. Mean Uncertain-tv Scores. 
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Figure 12. Mean Intentionalitv Scores. 
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Multiple Regression Analyses 
A series of step-wise multiple regression analyses 
we're preformed for each of: the entire sample, the 
out-patient group, the student group, student male 
group, student female group, out-patient male group, and 
out-patient female group, to examine the relative 
contribution of the attributions generated from the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire and the three locus of 
control scores in predicting depression scores. 
Analysis 1 (see Table 8) revealed a significant 
overall standardized coefficient of .39, F(l, 
141)=43.67, p<.001 for the Uncertainty dimension, with 
24 percent explained variance. A second variable was 
entered into the equation on Step 2, Internality, 
yielding a significant correlation of -.27, F(2, 
140)=33.15, p<.001, and 32 percent explained variance. 
On Step 3 the Powerful Other scale yielded a significant 
correlation of .27, F(3, 139)=29.73, p<.001, and 39 
percent explained variance. 
The second analysis involving the student group 
revealed an overall significant correlation coefficient 
for Uncertainty, .32, F(l, 115)=18.47, p<.001 with 14 
percent explained variance. On Step 2 Powerful Other 
yielded a significant coefficient, .26 F(2, 114)=14.00, 
E<-001 with 20 percent explained variance. On Step 3 
the Internality scale was entered into the equation with 
a significant coefficient of -.26, F(3, 113)=12.32, 
E<.001. On Step 4 the Control dimension yielded a 
significant correlation coefficient of .19, F(4, 
112)=10.52, p<.001. On Step 5 the Expectation dimension 
was entered yielding an overall coefficient of -.18, 
F(5, 111)=9.62, p<.001 with 30 percent explained 
variance. 
The third analysis on the out-patient group yielded 
two significant predictors. Powerful Other scale and the 
Uncertainty dimension with overall coefficients of .41, 
F(l, 24), p<.01 and .38, F(2, 23),p<.01, respectively. 
Analysis 4 of the step-wise multiple regression 
analyses, revealed a significant overall standardized 
coefficient of .53, F(l, 29)=11.17, p<.01 for the Chance 
variable, with 28 percent explained variance. A second 
variable was entered into the regression equation on 
Step 2. Uncertainty yielded a highly significant 
correlation coefficient of .33, F(2, 28)=8.56, p<.001 
with 38 percent of the variance explained. 
The fifth analysis on female students involving the 
Uncertainty attribution yielded an overall multiple 
regression correlation of .34, which is significant. 
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F(l, 84)=10.73, E<*01. The Powerful Other dimension was 
entered on Step 2 and yielded a significant overall 
multiple regression coefficient of .40, which is highly 
significant, F(2, 83)=7.92, p<.001. Uncertainty 
contributed 11 percent of explained variance, while 
Powerful Other contributed 16 percent of explained 
variance. 
For the sixth analysis on the male out-patient 
group, no variables were entered or removed from the 
analysis due to small sample size. Refer to Table 9 for 
a summary of the above results. 
Table 7 
Multiple Regression Analyses for each of: 
Mdle-Students, Male Out-patients, 
Female-Students, Female Out-patients 
















Predicting BDI scores from ASQ and IPC scores. 
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Predicting BDI scores from ASQ and IPC scores. 
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Male Out-patients, N=7 
No variables entered or removed from analysis. 
Analysis 7 
Female Out-patients, N=19 
Powerful Other .60 .36 9.45** .60 
.34 .11 10.73** .34 
.40 .16 7.92*** .22 
.28 11.17** .53 
.38 8.56*** .33 
***E<.001 **E<* 01 
The seventh analysis on the female out-patient group 
yielded a significant overall correlation of .60, for 
the Powerful Other dimension, which is significant, F(l, 
17)=9.45, p<.01, with 36 percent explained variance. 
Correlations 
Averages for Upset, Control, Locus of Causality, 
Stability, Globality, Recurrence, Intentionality. 
Expectation, Uncertainty dimensions for each subject 
were obtained. Pearson product correlations were 
computed between all independent variables including BDI 
scores. Refer to Table 10 for a summary of significant 
correlations. 
Globality yielded a significant correlation with 
BDI, (r=.33, p<.01). The Internal scale from the IPC 
scales correlated negatively with BDI scores (r=-.36, 
P<.001), whereas. Powerful Other and Chance scales 
correlated positively, (r=.41, p<.001; r=.38, p<.001, 
respectively). Powerful Other and Chance scales 
correlated significantly, (r=,63, p<.001). 
Total number of significant life events correlated 
significantly positive with depression scores, 
Globality, Upset, and Uncertainty, (r=.45, p<.001; 
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r=.30, E<.001; r=.37, £<.001; r=.37, £<.001, 
respectively). 
' Age correlated negatively with Control, (r=-.23, 
£<.01), thereby, indicating that with age, the less 
control one is believed to have over the occurrence of 
significant life events. 
Upset yielded significant correlations for all 
variables except the Internal scale of the IPC scales. 
Uncertainty also yielded a number of significant 
correlations for all variables except for the Internal 
scale. Locus of Causality, and Stability dimensions. 
Table 10 
Summary of Significant Correlations Between Variables 
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Locus of Control and Depression 
Using the three-factor measure of locus of control, 
the present study revealed that Internality was 
significantly negatively correlated with depression, 
while Powerful Other and Chance scales were 
significantly positively associated with depression 
scores (r=-.36; .41; .37, p<.001, respectively). 
Correlations between IPC scales support the conceptual 
distinction between them, since the correlations between 
Internality and the other two scales (-.13 with Powerful 
Other, and -.18 with Chance) are modest. These findings 
are consistent with those of Ganellen and Blaney (1982). 
Powerful Other and Chance scales were significantly 
correlated (r=.63, £<.001). 
Of the three scales. Powerful Other, correlated the 
most with overall depression (r=.41, p<.001), thereby, 
suggesting that the more people attribute the outcome of 
stressful events to powerful people around them, the 
more depressed they tend to be. One possible 
explanation for this finding would be what Schill, 
Ramanaiah, and Toves (1982) refer to as a defensive 
pattern of blame projection and mistrust employed by 
these defensive external scorers who may isolate 
themselves from potential sources of support in their 
environment and thereby enhance their vulnerability to 
stress. 
The female out-patient group had the highest mean 
Powerful Other and mean Chance score as well as the 
lowest mean Internal score across all other groups. 
These results suggest that it is a possible combination 
of expectation of control by powerful people and high 
beliefs in chance factors which are characteristic of 
significantly depressed individuals. Nonetheless, the 
results support the central tenet that the more one 
views reinforcements as non-contingent upon their 
behaviour and act accordingly, the more prone towards 
depression, and helplessness. 
Male out-patients, on the other hand had Internality 
scores much closer to those of the student group. 
Powerful Other scores were significantly lower than 
those of all other groups, while Chance scores were also 
significantly lower than all other groups. According to 
Ganellen and Blaney (1984) when externals experience 
high levels of depression, as did the female out-patient 
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group, then externality to chance or powerful others 
should reflect perception of control over future events. 
Furthermore, they postulate that when high Internals 
such as the male out-patient group experience high 
levels of depression, they reflect perception of control 
over past significant events. Externals may 
characteristically exert less effort into coping 
attempts than will those who believe that they can 
influence outcomes (Procuik, Breen, & Lussier, 1976). 
Internals may demonstrate reactance in the face of 
stress perceived as uncontrollable that is, they exert 
more effort because they perceive more control than they 
really have (Wortman & Brehm, 1975). As a result the 
more effort they exert to assume control, the more 
depressed they become. 
Attributional Style and Depression 
The present study attempted to study attributional 
style in a clinically depressed population in addition 
to a student population. In studies using depressed 
psychiatric samples, no significant differences have 
been reported between depressed and non-depressed 
psychiatric patients on ASQ scores (Hargreaves, 1985; 
Miller, Klee, Norman, 1982). Furthermore, Miller et al. 
(1982) found no significant differential attributional 
styles despite using attributions of real-life events. 
The results of the present study are more consistent 
with the above findings. 
As an entire group, out-patients were significantly 
more depressed than students. Out-patients were more 
upset over significant life events, and as a result 
experienced greater uncertainty in their lives. They 
also attributed significantly more stable and global 
causal attributions than students. These results are 
consistent with the reformulated learned helplessness 
model of maladaptive attributional style. 
More specifically, however, out-patient findings are 
confounded by female out-patient scores. Results 
indicate that most depressed female out-patients 
attribute the causes of significant life events to 
external factors (mean locus of causality = 5.26) and 
not to internal causes. This finding is crucial 
because, it does not support one of the central tenets 
of the reformulated model (Seligman et al. 1979; 
Abramson et al. 1978; Hammon & Mayol, 1982) that 
depressed subjects characteristically make internal 
attributions of causality for negative events and that 
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they attribute the causes of good events to unstable, 
external factors compared to non-depressed individuals. 
It could be argued here, that the present study presents 
a confound for negative events with positive events 
because the two were not separated. All events from the 
Life Events Inventory were regarded as stressful and 
requiring adjustment (Cochrane & Robertson, 1973; 
Ganellen & Blaney, 1984). In spite of the possibility, 
female out-patients only indicated three positive 
(desirable-responsible) events as a group for which 
attributions were rated. This is hardly a significant 
number, therefore, the possibility of a confound of 
positive events, does not seem likely to explain these 
results. 
On the other hand, male out-patients (M BDI = 
9.71) indicated only two positive events for which 
causal attributions were made. They indicated 
significantly less depression than female out-patients, 
but significantly greater depression than both 
female/male student groups. Male out-patients made 
significantly more internal, stable, global attributions 
than student groups. This result is consistent with the 
reformulated model. Further research is needed to 
determine whether this attributional style reflects a 
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consistent sex difference or whether degree/severity of 
depression is a mediator variable. However, when 
coitiparing female out-patients and female students, 
differential external locus of causality attributions 
were not significant, in fact the mean causality scores 
were extremely similar (5.26, s=1.30; 5.24, s=1.50, 
respectively) with little variability. Therefore, 
severity of depression seems unlikely a variable 
affecting these results. A possible positive event 
confound may exist for female students since 14.35 
percent of all events reported were of the desirable- 
responsible kind. A consistent sex difference for 
depressed and non-depressed groups is a plausible 
explanation for the present findings and discrepancy 
between male and female depressed subjects with respect 
to locus of causality. Females, whether depressed or 
not, attributed the cause of stressful events to 
external factors (such as fate, chance, circumstances, 
or other persons) more so than males. 
The locus of causality scale and controllable 
dimension of causes were highly related (r=-.44, p<.001) 
which means that the more internal the causal 
attribution, the greater controllability experienced 
over the significant events. In addition to maladaptive 
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attributional style, Harvey (1981) found that depressed 
students were consistent in attributing personal events 
to internal, but controllable causes over negative 
events. In this study depressed female out-patients 
attributed significant life events to external and 
uncontrollable causes. Mildly depressed male 
out-patients attributed significant life events to 
internal but uncontrollable causal factors. Neither of 
these results is consistent with those of Harvey (1981) 
nor Hamraon and Mayol (1982) each of which found that 
depressives made significant more attributions to 
internal and controllable factors than non-depressed 
students. 
Abramson et al. (1978) described the controllable 
dimension as logically orthogonal to the internal- 
external, stable-unstable, and global-specific causal 
dimensions, but probably empirically correlated with 
internal and unstable attributions. And since the 
controllable dimension of causes has been established to 
be related to self-blame (Harvey, 1981) it is also 
necessary for the adequate assessment of cognitions 
underlying the helplessness/self-blame paradox in 
depression (Abramson & Sackeim, 1977). The results of 
the present study seem to give credence to the learned 
helplessness model of depression, rather than to the low 
self-esteem models of depression or negative self- 
ahtitude models of depression (Beck, 1967). The 
significantly depressed people in the present study 
(female out-patients) are depressed and feel helpless 
because they believe their significant stressful life 
events were caused externally and the outcomes are 
independent of their own behaviour as opposed to due to 
their own lack of ability, effort which would manifest 
itself in low self-esteem. The present depressed 
females, then, would logically behave in an apathetic, 
passive manner and would not necessarily exhibit low 
self-esteem. Furthermore, the female depressed group 
made significant uncontrollable attributions. Since 
attributions to controllable causes is related to 
self-blame, the female out-patients can be said not to 
have suffered from self-blame, but from the first form 
of helplessness, discussed earlier. 
On the other hand, male out-patients are said to 
have suffered from helplessness due to their own lack, 
ability, effort, which resulted in low self-esteem and 
self-depreciation over events perceived as 
uncontrollable. Mean controllable attributions were 
(3.33), significantly lower than the student groups. 
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Male out-patients, then, in contrast to female out- 
patients suffered from low self-esteem (due to internal 
attributions) and helplessness, (not necessarily 
self-blame/guilt). For the male out-patients internal 
causes were not perceived as controllable. 
Attributions. Locus of Control, and Depression 
The IPC scales, number of significant life events. 
Upset, Globality, and Uncertainty scales were each 
significantly correlated with depression, based on the 
entire subject sample. 
The correlation between Locus of Causality and 
Levenson's Internality scale was non-significant but in 
the expected direction (r=-.10). No significant 
correlations between Control dimension and Locus of 
Control scales were found. 
The purpose of the present study was in part to 
determine the best combination of depression predictors 
based on ASQ attributions and Locus of Control scales. 
The best combination for the combined sample is 
Uncertainty, Internality, and Powerful Other scores. 
For the female out-patient group the only predictor was 
the Powerful Other scale; while for male students the 
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best combination of predictors is Chance and 
Uncertainty; and for female students. Uncertainty and 
Powerful Other. 
The Uncertainty dimension seems to play a 
significant role in depression. Uncertainty is 
significantly correlated with the Powerful Other and 
Chance scales, as well as significantly negative with 
Control, Recurrence and Expectation. The concept of 
uncertainty, is theoretically related to the unknown 
regarding the future and hence, explains the very 
significant relationship between Globality and 
Uncertainty. Globality refers to generalization of 
depression. Furthermore, conceptually. Uncertainty 
and helplessness are related to one's ability to effect 
one's future meaningfully. In addition to the 
Uncertainty dimension the Powerful Other scale was a 
significant predictor for all groups, while Chance was 
specifically to male students, once again stressing the 
relationship between externality and depression. 
According to Parker, Brown, and Blignault (1986) the 
course of depression is better predicted by measures of 
current rather than general dominant personality 
variables and coping. The present study reveals that 
current, situation-specifically generated cognitions 
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such as degree of uncertainty are contributory, and that 
stable individual differences of how people perceive 
reinforcements are indeed important to a study of 
depression and perception of control. 
Due to the central role of Locus of Causality, the 
controllable causal attributions, and Locus of Control 
to the learned helplessness models of depression, their 
combinations among depressive groups is important to 
study. The significantly depressed group made more mean 
external, causal attributions to uncontrollable causes 
and an external locus of control (equally high Chance 
and Powerful Other scores). Male out-patients, however, 
made internal causal attributions to uncontrollable 
causes with a high mean internal locus of control. 
Female students make external causal attributions which 
tended toward the uncontrollable end. Male students 
made external attributions to controllable causes with a 
more internal locus of control. Depressives, then, seem 
to be both high externals and/or high internal scorers, 
thereby, supporting Rotter's (1967) theory regarding the 
curvilinear relationship between locus of control and 
adjustment. Individuals falling at either extreme may 
have greater difficulties in adjusting to stressful life 
events. However, this theory still does not account for 
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why out-patient males' internal scores were not 
significantly greater than those of students. 
In addition to the present findings further research 
is suggested to determine whether attributional styles 
are uniquely, related to depression or whether it is a 
feature of other psychopathologies. 
Furthermore, most experiments using research 
measurement tools and criterion situations have focused 
upon events that are largely in the range of 
controllability. Devices are needed which ascertain 
belief about events that are extremely improbable and 
commonly believed to be beyond control, such as victims 
of natural disasters, or terminally-ill sample groups 
(Lefcourt, 1976: Wise, Mann, Puscheck, Dove & Kiernan, 
1985). 
Future research should be concerned with the question 
of whether people actually make attributions 
spontaneously or whether they are just doing so in 
response to researcher's questions. Another limitation, 
here, is that subjects' recall of stressful events may 
be affected by their level of depression. How 
differential recall of stressful events might influence 
causal explanations is not clear, but some role is 
possible (Peterson et al. 1985). 
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Finally, the ratings of past stressful events and 
BDI scores were obtained at the same point in time. The 
helplessness reformulation assigns to cognitions a 
causal role (Abramson et al. 1978; Peterson et al. 1985; 
Peterson & Seligman, 1984) but the results are merely 
correlational. Future research is necessary to 
establish whether the relations between cognitions and 
depression are or are not causal. Because all the data 
were obtained at the same time, subjects may have 
imposed consistency on their responses (Peterson et al. 
1985). The present study data reflect the need for more 
sophisticated, long term designs with which they can 
assess the causal influence of cognitions on depression. 
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Appendix A 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH STUDY: 
DEPRESSION AND COGNITIONS OF SIGNIFICANT LIFE EVENTS 
The purpose of the research study is designed to review 
the relationship between depression and related 
cognitions as part of an experiment in partial 
fulfilment of a Master of Arts degree in clinical 
psychology. 
I,  , understand that my 
■participation in the study is entirely 
voluntary. 
(Please print) 
1. All responses are anonymous and thereby, 
confidential. SYOU are requested to write only your 
age and sex on the front of the test booklet. 
2. No physical and/or mental discomfort will arise from 
your participation in the research. 
3. It is understood that you, the participant, are free 
to decline to participate in or withdraw from 
research without any consequences to follow. 
4. Your participation in this study is in no way 
intended to be part of the treatment plan. 
5. You will not be identifiable as an individual in any 
report resulting from this research study. 
6. Please return the completed test booklet to the 
secretary on the day of your next appointment or 
you may complete it now in the waiting area. 
Witnessed by; Signature: 
Date: Date: 
Appendix B 
The following test package is designed to measure 
depression and related cognitions as part of an 
experiment in partial fulfilment of a thesis for a 
Master of Arts degree. 
All responses are anonymous. 
Please state your age and sex on this page. 
i 
1. The fo^llowing is o reliable moo d-m ea su rin g device. 
Read each item carefully and circle the number next to the 
answer that best reflects how you have been feeling during 
the past few days. Make sure you circle one answer for each 
of the questions. If more than one answer applies to how 
you have been feeling, circle the higher number. If in 
doubt, make your best guess. Do not leave any questions 
unanswered. (Several questions ask if you have recently 
been experiencing a particular symptom such as irritability 
or insomnia, "... any more than usual," or "... more than 
before." If the symptom has been present for a long time 
because of chronic depression, you are to answer the question 
based on a comparison of how you are feeling now with how 
you were feeling the last time you were happy and undepressed. 
If you believe you have never felt happy and undepressed, 
then answer the question based on a comparison of how you 
are feeling now with how you imagine a normal, undepressed 
person would feel.) 
1. 0 I do not feel sad. 
1 I feel sad. 
2 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
2.01 am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
3. 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1. I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
4. 
■ 2 
0 I get ns much satisfaction out of tilings as 1 used to. 
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
5. 0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 'I feel guilty all of the timei 
6. 0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel-I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
7. 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
1 I am disappointed in myself. 
2 I am disgusted with’myself. 





I don't feel I am any worse than- anybody else. 
I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
9. 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 1 have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2 Iwouldliketokillmyself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
I don't cry any more than usual. 
I cry more now than I used to. 
I cry all the time now. 





I am no more irritated by things than I ever am. 
I am slightly more irritated now than usual. 
I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of the time. 
I feel irritated all the time now. 
12. 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
2 I have lostmost of my interest inother people. 





I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 





I don't feel' that I look any worse than I used to. 
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
I feel, that there are permanent changes- in my appearance that 
make me look unattractive. 
I believe that 1 look ugly. ' .. 
3 
15. 0 I can work about as well as before. 
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
3 I can't do any work at all. 
16. 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
1 ,I don't sleep as well as I used to*. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to 
get back to sleep. 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot 
get back to sleep. 
17. 0 I don't get more tired than usual. 
1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired to do anything. 
18. 0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
2 My appetite is much worse now. 
3 I have no appetite at all anymore. 
19. 0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately. 
1 I have lost more than five pounds. 
2 I have lost more than ten pounds. 
3 I have lost more than fifteen pounds. 
20. 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, 
or upset stomach, or constipation. 
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to 
think of much else. 
3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot 
think about anything else. 
21. 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
4 
2. The follov^ng is a questionnaire to find out the way in w/iich 
certain important events in our society affect different people. 
Read each statement carefully and then rate from 0-6 how true 
the statement is for you. (0 means the statement is completely 
' *, -• ■ 
untrue; 6 means the statement is completely true). 
1.. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability. 
0 1-2 3 4 5 6 
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. I feel like what happens in my life,is mostly determined by 
powerful people. 
0 1 2 3 4 . '5 6 
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how 
good a driver I am. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interest from 
bad luck happenings.. 
0 1 ■ 2 3 4 5 6 
7. When I get what I want, it's usually because I'm lucky. 
0 1 '2. 3 4 5 6 
8. Although I might have good ability, I willnot be given leadership 
responsibility without appealing to those in positions of power. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LO. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
01 2 3 4 5 6 
5 
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. 
0 1 2 3 4 ■ 5 6 
• 12. Whether or not I get in to a car accident is mostly a matter 
o f luck. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
* K 
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our 
personal interests when they conflict with those of strong 
pressure groups. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
14. It's not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many 
things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I'm lucky 
enough to be in the right place at the right time. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
17. If important people were to decide they didn't like me,’I 
probably wouldn't make many friends. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the 
other driver. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
21. .When I get what I want, it's usually because I worked hard for it. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with 
the desires of people who have power over me. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
13. My life is determined by my own actions. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
!4. It's chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends 
or many friends. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 Foiiowifwj is on invenL<iry of significant life events 
Circle tlig events which have occurred witliin the 
previous 6 months of this study. 
Sccltim i. Ail 
1. Uiicmfiloymcnt (of licml of liouschold) 
2. Trouble with superiors at work 
3. New job in same line of work 
4. New j<ib in new line of work 
5. CbaiiEC in hours or comlilioiis in picsciK job 
6. I’loiuoiion or cbainjc of icsponsibililics at work 
7. Ifclircnicnt 
8. Moving bouse 
9. Purcliasing own house (taking out mortgage) 
to. New iiciglibours 
JI. Quarrel with neighbours 
12. Income increased susbtantially 
13. Income decreased substantially (25 "Q 
14. Getting into debt beyond means of repayment 
15. Going on holid.ny 
16. Conviction for minor violation (c.g. speeding or drunkenes 
17. Jail sentence 
1.8. Iiivol vcment in fight 
19. Immediate family member starts drinking heavily 
20. Immediate family member attempts stiicidc 
21. Immediate family mcmlicr sent to prison 
22. Dcatli of immediate family member 
23. IJcatb of close fricml 
21. Iiumcdialc family member scrionsly ill 
25. Gain of new family member (immediate)' 
26. (Prsdilems related to alcoliol or drugs) 
27. Serious restriction of social life 
28. (Perim! of homelessness (hostel or sleeping rough)) 
29. Serious I'hysical illness or injury rc(|uiriiig hospital treatment 
30. (Prolonged ill health rrt(uiriiig Ircatmciil by own doctor) 
31. Smiden and scrimis impairment of vision or hearing 
32. (Unwanted pregnancy) 
33. (Miscarriage) 
31. (Abortion) 
35. Sc.r difficulties 
Section 2. ETcr-marrIed only 
36. Marriage 
37. Prcgn.ancy (or of wife) 
38. Increase in number of arguments with spuu.se 
39. (Increase in number of arguments with other immediate 
family members (c.g. cliildrcii)) 
40. Trouble with otiicr relatives (c.g. in-laws) 
41. Son <’r dauglitcr left home 
42. (Chililrcn in care of others) 
43. (Trosible or behaviour problems in own children) 
44. IJcath of spouse 
45. Divorce 
46. Marital separation 
47. fislra-marita! sc.sual allair 
48. (Orcak up of affair) 
49. Infidelity of spouse 
50. Marital reconciliation 
51. Wife begins or stops ss-ork 
Sccllim .3. Never-married mdy 
52. (flrcak itp svilh steady hoy or girl friend) 
53. (Problems related to sc.sual relationship) 
54. (Increase in numljcr of family arguments (c.g. with parents)) 
55. (I)rcak up of family) 
4. For each of up to 5 most personally upsetting events 
indicated on the life events inventory, please answer 
the following questions. Rate each a-nswer on the 
7-point scale. Only circle one rrumber for each question. 
The questionnaire is a measure of one'^s attitudes 
towards significant life events. 
EVENT: 8 
1. How upsetting was the event for you? ,, , ,, 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
2. How much control over 
Uo Cci\irol‘‘ 
12 3 
the occurrence of. this event did you have”^ 
yVlu.c^C.On.h'al 
4 - 5 .. 6 . 7 
3. Did this event occur primarily because of something about you 
(such as personalityj effort)—or was it primarily due to 
something about the situation or another person or persons?. 
[3e c^ucsd 
.1-2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Did this event occur because 
(such as mood, effort, luck, 
relatively unchanging (e.g., 
situation or person)? 
12 3 4 
of something that changes readily 
or fate)--or because of something 
ability, unchanging qualities of a 
5 6 7 
5. To what extent do the causes 
of your life? 
//{.+ of 
12 3 V 4 
of this event affect other areas 
5 6 7 
.6. How likely do you feel that a similar event will occur in your 
life in the next 3 years? (Try to give an estimate based on 
your personal feelings rather than based on a rational judgement). 
\Je.vru . 
1-J2 3 4 5 6 7^'J 
Answer (a) or (b) . 
a) If this event occurred 
to what extent did you 
No I in fw- 
12 3 
primarily because of something about you, 
intend for this event to happen? 
n T'l o • 
4 5 6 7 
b) Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about 
the situation or person, to what extent did the other person or 
persons intentionally cause this event to happen to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
• How much had you expected tliis event to occur? 
■ /VcT-ci ccK - 
12 3 ■ 4 5 6 7 
. How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a 
result of this event? 
\ifu '' • 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
tVENT: 9 
1, How upsetting was the event for you? 
A/if a.taH 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
yvi lACjv 
2. How much control over 
1 ‘ 2 3 
the occurrence of this event did you have"^ 
4 5 ;• 6 ■ 7 
3. Did this event occur primarily because of something about you 
(such as per.sonal i ty, effort)--or was it primarily due to 
something about the situation or another person or persons?, . 
2 3 \ 5 6 7 
cnjxSi 
. 1 
Did this event occur because 
(such as mood, effort, luck, 
relatively unchanging (e.g., 
situation or person)? 
12 3 4 
of something that changes readily 
or fate)--or because of something 
ability, unchanging qualities of a 
5 6 7 
To what extent do the 
of your life? 
//cT al all 
12 3 
causes of this event affect other areas 
4 5 6 7 
. How likely do you feel that a similar event will occur in your 
life in the next 3 years? (Try to give an estimate based on 
your personal feelings rather than based on a rational judgement). 
1-^2 3 4 5 6 
Answer (a) or (b). 
)• k 
If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, 
to what extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
V<& (V» fV\v^.cJL iWir^rxXia . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about 
the situation or person, to what extent did the other person or 
persons intentionally cause this event to happen to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much had you expected this event to occur? 
c>./( 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
How much uncertainty have 
result of this event? 
1 
you experienced in your life as a 
7 2 3 4 5 6 
tVENT: 10 
1. How upsetting was the event for you? 
f/afo-tall \/eir^ KVIIACA-* 
2. How much control over the occurrence of this event did you have? 
fJo Ccvfr-ol 
1 ' 2 3 4 5 ■ 6 7 
3. Did this event occur primarily because of something about you 
(such as personality, effort)--or was it primarily due to 
something about the situation or another person or persons?, 
.1-2 3 4 5 6 7 
4, Did this event occur because 
(such as mood, effort, luck, 
relatively unchanging (e.g., 
situation or person)? 
12 3 4 
of something that changes readily 
or fate)--or because of something 
ability, unchanging qualities of a 
5 6 7 
5. To what extent do the 
of your life? 
ai Cl 11 
12 3 
causes of this event affect other areas 
4 5 6 
6. How likely do you feel that a similar event will occur in your 
life in the next 3 years? (Try to give an estimate based on 
your personal feelings rather than based on a rational judgement). 
U^U'U^^ \J(L ' 
1^ 2 3 4 5 6 
Answer (a) or (b). 
) If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, 
to what extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
) Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about 
the situation or person, to what extent did the other person or 
persons intentionally cause this event to happen to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 
How much had you expected this event to occur? 
ceil 
1 2. 3 4 5 6 
How much uncertainty have you experienced in your 
result of this event? 
/Vr»-7v£_ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
life as a 
7 
EVENT: 11 
1. Hoiv upsetting was the event for you? L, 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. How much control over the occurrence of this event, did you have’ 
UoCo,s¥-o\ }V[u.cS^CO^J^ol 
' 1 ' 2 3 4 5 . 6 . 7 
**' * 1 
3. Did this event occur primarily because of something about you 
(such as personality., effort)--or was it primarily due to 
something about the situation or another person or persons?, .. 
■ )5<!c^se-cf- 
.1-2 3 . 4 ' 5 6 7 
4. Did this event occur because 
(such as mood, effort, luck, 
relatively unchanging (e.g., 
situation or person)? 
12 3 4 
of something that changes readily 
or fate)--or because of something 
ability, unchanging qualities of a 
5 6 7 
5- To what extent do the 
of your life? 
//ct ai c( 11 
12 3 
causes of this event affect other areas 
4 5 6 
rv\U-c4- 
6. How likely do you feel that a similar event will occur in your 
life in the next 3 years? (Try to give an estimate based on 
your personal feelings rather than based on a rational judgement). 
Vc-VM ■ hke_lu . 
1-J2 3 4 5 6 
Answer (a) or (b). 
a) If this event occurred 
to what extent did you 
|V\ rw- 
12 3 
primarily because of something about you, 
intend for this event to happen? 
4 5 6 7 
5) Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about 
the situation or person, to what extent did the other person or 
persons intentionally cause this event to happen to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
. How much had you expected this event to occur? 
/v/jrf’ 0.11 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
. How much uncertainty 
result of this event? 
1 
have you experienced in your life as a 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
EVENT: 12 
1. How upsetting was the event for you? ,, , ,r'Lj 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. How much control over the occurrence of this event did you have? 
fJoCcjxkol ... yVii^cS^COK-irol 
1 ' 2 3 4 5 6 .. 7 
I 
3. Did this event occur primarily because of something about you 
(such as personality, effort)--or was it primarily due to 
something about the situation or another person or persons?, ,, 
.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Did this event occur because of something that changes readily 
(such as mood, effort, luck, or fate)--or because of something 
relatively unchanging (e.g., ability, unchanging qualitiesof a 
situation or person)? ‘ . 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
5. To what extent do the causes 
of your life? 
//cf iff «/l 
12 3 4 




6. How likely do you feel that a similar event will occur in your 
life in the next 3 years? (Try to give an estimate based on 
your personal feelings rather than based on a rational judgement). 
(.(.\ li' Je.tri^ hkC-lu . 
1-J2 3 4 5 6 
Answer (a) or (b). 
a) If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, 
to what extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
>) Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about 
the situation or person, to what extent did the other person or 
persons intentionally cause this event to happen to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
. HOW much had you expected this event to occur? 
■ C't Ct-ll 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
. HOW much uncertainty have you experienced in your 
result of this event? 
1 
life as a 
7 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix C 
The Attribution Style Questionnaire (1982) 
consists of the following items rated on 7-points 
scales: 
(1) How upsetting was the event for you? (Upset) 
(2) How much control over the occurrence of this event 
did you have? (Control) 
(3) Did this event occur primarily because of something 
about you (such as personality, effort)—or was it 
primarily due to something about the situation or 
another person or persons? (Locus of causality) 
(4) Did this event occur because of something that 
changes readily (such as mood, effort, luck or 
fate)—or because of something relatively 
unchanging (e.g., ability, unchanging qualities of 
a situation or person)? (Stability) 
(5) To what extent do the causes of this event affect 
other areas of your life? (Globality) 
(6) How likely do you feel that a similar event will 
occur in your life in the next 3 years? (Try to 
give an estimate based on your personal feelings 
rather than based on a rational judgement). 
(Recurrence) 
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(7) (a) If this event occurred primarily because of 
something about you, to what extent did you intend 
for this event to happen? (Intentionality) 
(b) Or, to what extent did other person or persons 
intend for the event to happen to you? 
(8) How much had you expected this to occur? 
(Expectation) 
(9) How much uncertainty have you experienced in your 
life as a result of this event? (Uncertainty) 
